The effect of subscription video-on-demand on piracy: evidence from a household-level randomized experiment by Matos, Miguel Godinho de et al.
The Effect of Subscription Video-on-Demand on Piracy:
Evidence From a Household Level Randomized
Experiment ∗
Miguel Godinho de Matos1,a, Pedro Ferreira2,3,b, and Michael D. Smith3,b
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We partner with a major multinational telecommunications provider to analyze the
effect of Subscription Video-on-Demand (SVoD) services on digital piracy. For a period
of 45 consecutive days, a group of randomly selected households who used BitTorrent
in the past were gifted with a bundle of TV channels with movies and TV shows that
could be streamed as in SVoD. We find that, on average, households that received the
gift increased overall TV consumption by 4.6% and reduced Internet downloads and
uploads by 4.2% and 4.5%, respectively. However, and also on average, treated house-
holds did not change their likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment. Our
findings are heterogeneous across households and are mediated by the fit between the
preferences of households in our sample for movies and the content available as part of
the gifted channels. Households with preferences aligned with the gifted content reduced
their probability of using BitTorrent during the experiment by 18% and decreased their
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amount of upload traffic by 45%. We also show using simulation that the size of the
SVoD catalog and licensing window restrictions limit significantly the ability of content
providers to match SVoD offerings to the preferences of BitTorrent users. Finally, we
estimate that households in our sample are willing to pay at most $3.25 USD per month
to access a SVoD catalog as large as Netflix’s in the US. Together, our results show
that, as a stand-alone strategy, using legal SVoD to curtail piracy will require, at the
minimum, offering content much earlier, and at much lower prices than those currently
offered in the marketplace, changes that are likely to reduce industry revenue and may
damage overall incentives to produce new content while, at the same time, might curb
only a small share of piracy.
1 Introduction
Digitization is transforming the entertainment industries: books, music and video. On the
supply side, digitization reduced the fixed cost of content creation (Waldfogel, 2012) as well
as the marginal costs of both reproduction and distribution (Varian, 2005). On the demand
side, digitization provided end-users with easy access to digital piracy on a global-scale
(Belleflamme et al., 2014; Danaher et al., 2013; Waldfogel, 2012). For example, according
to Price (2013), in January 2013, 26% of the Internet users in North-America, Europe and
Asia-Pacific – that is, 327 million unique users – sought copyrighted content from illegal
online sources, a 9.9% increase from 2011. The widespread growth of digital piracy led
researchers to study its impact on the entertainment industry. A number of theoretical
models show that piracy may hurt firm profit, but increase short-term social welfare (Peitz
and Waelbroeck (2006)). Researchers have also looked at strategies that may reduce piracy,
such as litigation against digital theft, enacting more restrictive intellectual property laws
(Boag, 2004; Groennings, 2005; Belleflamme et al., 2014) and developing technologies that
make copying more difficult (Sinha et al., 2010). The empirical research finds that these
approaches generally reduce piracy and increase sales through legal channels (Danaher and
Smith, 2014; Danaher et al., 2014, 2015; Danaher, 2015).
Less effort has been put into analyzing how new legal channels to distribute media affect
piracy (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Waldfogel, 2012; Danaher et al., 2010). However, such
research is important given the number of new technologies and business models developed
to distribute digital content (e.g. iTunes selling songs individually as opposed to full albums
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(Waldfogel, 2010)). Using these technologies, content providers and content distributors
have added subscription based services to existing pay-per-view services (e.g., LastFM and
Spotify (Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2015)), which changed the way people consume and relate
to media, which in many cases have had strong implications for how people perceive media
ownership. Examples in the entertainment industry include the introduction of MovieLink
in 2002 by a consortium of movie studios (Sony, Universal, MGM, Paramount and Warner)
(Ulin, 2013), which allowed for downloading movies from the Internet, and later in 2007 the
use of online streaming services such as Netflix.
In this paper we study how the legal distribution of free content to pirates changes their
behavior. The first contribution of our paper is that we analyze the impact of piracy in the
context of subscription video on demand content, an increasingly important source of video
consumption. This contrasts with much of the prior literature that has analyzed the impact
of piracy on a la carte sales of media products such as songs books and movies (Smith and
Telang, 2009, 2010; Danaher et al., 2010; Waldfogel, 2010; Danaher and Smith, 2014). The
second contribution of our paper is that we use data from a randomized field experiment at
the household level. This contrasts with previous studies that relied mostly on aggregate
data obtained from natural experiments (Danaher et al., 2013) and allows us to measure het-
erogeneous treatment effects. During this experiment, households that had previously used
BitTorrent were given free access to 10 premium TV channels that broadcast movies and TV
shows. The content broadcasted in these channels could be consumed as Subscription-based
Video-on-Demand (SVoD) using time-shift TV. We find that, on average, giving pirates
access to these channels increased their consumption of TV by 4.6%, decreased their con-
sumption of Internet, both download and upload traffic by 4.2% and 4.5%, respectively, but
did not change their likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment. These results
show that it is hard to curtail piracy using SVoD.
The third contribution of our work is to identify a mechanism behind this result. We
develop a recommender system for media content based on the observed behavior of pirates
and compute the fit between what this system recommends to households in our sample and
the content offered as part of the SVoD catalog. We find that the likelihood of reducing piracy
is mediated by the fit between the latter and the household’s preferences for media content.
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In particular, our models show that pirate households with a theoretical 100% fit with the
free content offered by the SVoD service would reduce their likelihood of using BitTorrent
by only 18% during the experiment. The fourth contribution of our paper is to use the data
from the randomized experiment described above to estimate the pirates’ willingness to pay
for the SVoD service. Using a multinomial logit model in which households can watch media
using Transactional VoD (TVoD), SVoD, or piracy (or a combination of these channels), we
show that households in our sample would likely pay at most $3.25 USD/month to access
a SVoD catalog as large as that offered by Netflix in the US (5,600 titles). We also show
empirically that such a catalog would likely have only 50% fit with the preferences of pirates.
Taken together, our results show that, as a stand-alone strategy, using legal channels
to reduce piracy will face significant challenges from three main sources. First, and most
important, our results show that even when legal SVoD channels are offered for free, and
even when there is a very high fit between the content they offer and the interests of pirates,
only very few pirates choose to shift their consumption from the pirated content to (free)
legal SVoD content. This suggests that to convince users to stop piracy, firms will first
need to increase the marginal cost of consuming pirated content (through, for example,
higher search costs to discover pirated content, introducing technological inconvenience in
consuming pirated content, or imposing other legal risks).
Second, even for the relatively small number of pirates who do choose to shift their
consumption from pirate to legal SVoD, our recommender system analysis shows a relatively
low fit between the content currently licensed to SVoD services and the interests of a typical
pirate. This suggests that to attract pirates, content owners will need to make significant
changes to their established business models of delayed licensing across various sales channels.
Finally, our results show that the consequence of the low levels of fit and marginal cost of
piracy ist that even if pirates choose to adopt SVoD channels, they have a very low willingness
to pay for content catalogs ($3.25 USD/month for a Netflix-scale catalog of SVoD material),
which is well below current market prices for legal SVoD services.
In short, our modeling, experimental and simulation results all show that, absent sig-
nificant changes in the marginal cost of consuming pirate content, using video-on-demand
to reduce piracy is likely to be effective only if content distributors can offer content much
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earlier than they do today and at prices much lower than those currently offered in the mar-
ketplace. These changes, however, are likely to reduce industry revenue streams and may
damage overall incentives for creators to produce new content.
2 Literature Review
The introduction of Napster in 1999 led to a boom in digital piracy, which in turn led to
research in digital piracy in various fields including information systems, economics, and
marketing (Danaher et al., 2013). This body of work addresses two fundamental research
questions: (1) does the availability of illegal digital copies of copyrighted content hurt firms
and/or societal welfare? and (2) which strategies can be pursued to limit the availability
and the impact of pirated copies?
The empirical work analyzing the first question generally finds that piracy hurts firms
by reducing legal sales. In the context of music, researchers have analyzed individual-level
survey data (Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2006; Waldfogel, 2010), as well as city-level
cross sectional data (Liebowitz, 2008), concluding that illegal music file-sharing is harmful
for industry profits. The exception is the work of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) who
find no effect. With respect to the movie industry, Bounie et al. (2006); Rob and Waldfogel
(2007); Bai and Waldfogel (2012) use survey data to find that file-sharing is harmful for the
industry. Other studies reach similar conclusions using panel data (Ma et al., 2014) and
data from natural experiments (Danaher et al., 2010; Danaher and Smith, 2014). Smith and
Telang (2009) is a notable exception in this context. The authors show that the availability
of pirated copies of movies shown on broadcast TV, typically 2-3 years after their initial
release in theaters, has no impact on subsequent DVD sales. However, and as the authors
acknowledge, they do not look at the impact of piracy in the early stages of the movie’s life
cycle when it may have a significant negative impact on sales.
With respect to the welfare effect of piracy, two papers are worth noting. Rob and
Waldfogel (2006) use survey data on consumers’ valuations of music albums to estimate
that a third of the gain in consumer surplus that arises from piracy comes at the expense
of producers, while the remainder comes from deadweight loss. Another paper is Telang
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and Waldfogel (2014) where the authors analyze the impact of VCR-based piracy on the
production of movies in India. They find that piracy caused a significant decline in the
number and quality of new movies produced by Bollywood studios.
Another stream of literature explores how product quality, search costs and legal pros-
ecution impact piracy behavior. A number of theoretical models assume that pirate copies
have lower quality than the originals, and that firms can limit the effects of piracy through
product differentiation. For example, Geng and Lee (2013) develop a model of sequential
search where consumers obtain digital goods from a legal channel or from the piracy chan-
nel. The authors study how different piracy controls — increasing search costs, decreasing
the quality of pirate copies, reducing the availability of illegal alternatives and reducing the
number of piracy sites — affect market prices, consumer surplus and firm profit. They show
that reducing the quality of pirate copies and increasing their search costs may be effective
strategies to limit the harmful impact of piracy but they may also yield heterogeneous effects
across consumers. In a similar vein, Wu and Chen (2008) show that under certain conditions
versioning can be an effective tool to fight piracy in digital information goods and it can
both substitute or complement other instruments that may increase the cost of piracy. In
addition, see Sundararajan (2004); Chellappa and Shivendu (2005); Belleflamme and Picard
(2007); Johar et al. (2012) for other examples of related theoretical work.
Empirical work in digital piracy has also analyzed extensively the effects of Digital Rights
Management (DRM) and litigation. Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) find that increasing litigation
threats decreases piracy but does not reduce the availability of illegal content. Sinha et al.
(2010) show that DRM may actually increase piracy because it decreases the usability of
digital content, which, in turn, reduces the consumers’ willingness to pay for content. Zhang
(2014) studies the effect of removing DRM from digital music sales, Reimers (2016) study
the effectiveness of private copyright protection in the book industry, Danaher et al. (2014)
evaluate the effects of the introduction of the HADOPI law on digital music sales, Danaher
and Smith (2014) analyze the impact of the shutdown of Megaupload on movie sales, Aguiar
et al. (2015) study the effect of taking down copyright-infringing websites in Germany and
Danaher et al. (2015) and Danaher et al. (2016) study the impact of website blocking in the
UK on piracy and on consumption through legal channels. In general, these papers find that
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anti-piracy efforts can reduce piracy and, in some cases, increase legal consumption in the
short term.
Relatively less attention has been devoted to study how new digital distribution chan-
nels, such as Transactional Video-on-Demand (TVoD) – also called pay-per-view — and
Subscription-based Video-on-Demand (SVoD), affect digital piracy (Belleflamme et al., 2014;
Waldfogel, 2012; Danaher et al., 2010). These new distribution channels increase the amount
and variety of content that consumers can watch at their leisure. For example, subscription-
based services allow consumers to watch as much content as they want when they want.
Technologies such as time-shift TV allow consumers to watch their preferred TV shows and
movies whenever they want (Wilbur, 2008; Belo et al., 2016). If consumers are able to more
conveniently find content on legal channels that better match their preferences, then they
may use them more often instead of illegally downloading content from the Internet.
So far, only Danaher et al. (2010) and Danaher (2015) have studied the effect of channel
competition on piracy. In Danaher et al. (2010) the authors use data from a natural exper-
iment to show that removing TV content from iTunes increased piracy. Similarly, Danaher
(2015) analyze how adding content to Hulu.com reduces piracy on that content. These stud-
ies provide preliminary evidence of substitution between piracy and legal channels but they
do so using: (1) outcomes from natural experiments, which limits the ability to ascertain
causal effects, and (2) country level data, which does not allow for analyzing the household-
level drivers of the observed changes. Our paper addresses both these shortcomings by using
a field experiment observed at the household-level Further, the richness of our data allows us
to generate an estimate of the pirates’ willingness to pay for the legal distribution channel.
3 Model
Consider a representative consumer who can choose to consume content from three different
sources: (i) Transactional Video-on-Demand (TVoD) (e.g. iTunes); (ii) Subscription Video-
on-Demand (SVoD) (e.g. Netflix) and (iii) piracy (e.g. using BitTorrent). These channels
are characterized by the following features:
• TVoD: consumers choose the content that matches their preferences and pay an average
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price p per piece of content purchased. TVoD catalogs are generally very large (Resnick
and Varian, 1997). Hence, we assume that consumers using TVoD watch the content
that they want to watch the most and thus there is no misfit between supply and
demand under this channel;
• SVoD: consumers can watch any content they want from a pre-determined catalog
negotiated between the content distributor and content providers and pay an average
access fee A to access all content in the library. The catalog changes over time but
at any point in time it may prevent consumers from watching the content that they
most want to watch. Therefore, consumers bear an average misfit cost m per piece of
content watched under this channel;
• Piracy: consumers must bear a fixed learning cost F to pirate, for example, they need
to learn how to use BitTorrent. Once they bear this cost, pirates are likely to find
the content that best matches their preferences and thus the marginal cost associated
to using this channel, call it c, does not arise from unmatched preferences but, for
example, from differences between the quality of the downloaded copy and that of the
original version, from moral qualms associated with illegal behavior, or from expected
litigation costs;
Assume that the utility derived from consuming q pieces of content is given by V (q), with
V (·) increasing and concave. Let qT , qS and qP represent the number of pieces of content




V (qT + qS + qP )− pqT −mqS − cqP
subject to L = qT + qS + qP
where L represents the amount of time allocated to watching content (the total number
of movies households can consume in the time allocated to watching content). Furthermore,
assume that each channel has enough content to cover L time. In the experiment we describe
in the next sections we have both A = 0 and F = 0 because our industrial partner offered
SVoD to pirates (who have already learned how to use BitTorrent) at no cost. In this
8
setting, the consumer chooses to allocate her time to consume media from the channels with







(L, 0, 0) if p < m and p < c
(0, L, 0) if m < p and m < c
(0, 0, L) if c < p and c < m
(x, L− x, 0) if p = m and p < c
(x, 0, L− x) if p = c and p < m
(0, x, L− x) if m = c and m < p
(x, y, L− x− y) if p = m = c
where x ∈ [0, L] and y ∈ [0, L]. A consumer that uses only the SVoD channel bears a
misfit cost of mL because she spends all of her time watching movies that do not completely
match her preferences. However, this consumer may, for example, shift some of her consump-
tion, say z, to the TVoD channel. In this case, her misfit cost decreases to m(L − z) but a
price pz has to be paid for the consumption in the TVoD channel. Therefore, for consumers
using only SVoD and TVoD, A+m(L− z) + pz is a measure of the cost they pay to watch z
from TVoD and L−z from SVoD compared to what would happen in a world where the best
content for them would be available for free. Two interesting features arise from this simple
model. First, consumers may choose to consume from different channels simultaneously if
the marginal costs associated to them are similar. Second, when the cost of piracy is zero,
consumers will only consume from the TVoD channel if the latter charges zero price. It is,
however, unreasonable to believe that content providers and content distributors can sus-
tainably offer TVoD content for free. Likewise, when the cost of piracy is zero consumers will
only consume from the SVoD channel if the latter has no misfit. However, and as we show
later in this paper, it is extremely hard to build SVoD catalogs with low misfit costs even if
one takes into consideration the observed preferences of pirates. Therefore, if a pirate uses
TVoD or SVoD it must be that the cost of piracy is not zero. We use this fact later in the
paper to estimate how much pirates are willing to pay for SVoD. Finally, the model above
also shows that no substitution away from the piracy channel towards the SVoD channel may
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arise from either a low marginal cost of the former or a high misfit cost of the latter. Later
in this paper we use a proxy for the fit of the SVoD channel to empirically disambiguate
these effects. This, in turn, allows us to test whether the marginal cost of piracy is zero. If
this cost is not zero then we expect consumers with better fit with the free SVoD offer to be
more likely to reduce their piracy consumption.
4 Experimental Context and Design
4.1 Experimental Context
Our industrial partner, hereinafter called TELCO, is a large multinational telecommunica-
tions provider. It is the market leader in Pay-TV services in the country we analyze, serving
more than 1 million households. It also offers high speed Internet service, both transactional
(TVoD) and subscription-based (SVoD) Video-on-Demand, and Automated Cloud Recording
(ACR) with a 1 week time window. The basic television service offered by TELCO includes
100 TV channels and access to a TVoD library with more than 2,000 movies and TV shows.
In addition, TELCO sells access to packs of thematic TV channels such as documentaries,
music, sports, movies and TV shows that households can subscribe to a-la carte. Our study
focus on the Cinema Pack, which is a bundle of 10 TV channels – 8 with movies and 2 with
TV shows – that can be purchased for 13 USD/month. These channels broadcast attractive
content, including popular TV shows, such as House of Cards, Suits and Fargo, just a few
days after they premier in the US. The Cinema Pack is covered by TELCO’s ACR service
and therefore households that subscribe to it can watch any movie or TV show that aired
in these channels for a week after the broadcast date without the need to pre-record them.
Effectively, accessing the Cinema Pack with time-shift capabilities resembles a SVoD service,
as depicted in Figure 1.
TELCO’s fixed Internet service allows for download speeds between 3 and 300 Mbps.
Upload speeds vary between 1 and 10 Mbps. There are no monthly restrictions on the
amount of data that households can exchange with the Internet. Overall, 37% of the traffic in
TELCO’s network is associated with peer-to-peer file-sharing, 35% pertains to web browsing,
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Figure 1: Interface to access the content of the Cinema Pack with time-shift TV, which
resembles a SVoD service in which consumers can choose movies and TV shows to watch






































19% is video and the remaining 9% is associated with a number of other services such as
video-gaming and voice over IP. BitTorrent accounts for 20% of the download traffic and
68% of the upload traffic that can be identified. Peer-to-peer file sharing originates in a
small fraction of TELCO’s clients, less than 10% of the households. BitTorrent accounts for
95% of the Internet upload traffic that can be identified and that pertains to peer-to-peer
file sharing.
4.2 Dataset
We analyze an anonymized daily panel of household level data for the months of April, May
and December 2014, and January and February 2015. The data for the months of April and
May 2014 were used by TELCO to set up the randomized experiment described in detail
in section 4.3), which took place between December 2014 and February 2015. This dataset
contains information on the services subscribed, the time spent watching each TV channel,
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overall download and upload traffic and identifiable BitTorrent streams.
TELCO collects only aggregate Internet usage statistics. It does not hold data at the
household level on URLs accessed. Therefore, we relied on a third party provider that
regularly monitors the most popular active online BitTorrent swarms (all peers uploading
and downloading a given torrent) and keeps a log of all IP addresses that were seen sharing
content. This service also registers identifiers for the content that is shared. These IP
addresses were matched to IP addresses at TELCO by another entity, who provides data
escrow services. This process ensured that as a research party we only dealt with anonymized
data and that no party could independently revert the encryption keys matching household
accounts to their BitTorrent activity.
We did not disclose to TELCO the entity providing the BitTorrent logs. This entity
claims that its logs are a representative sample of online BitTorrent streams. However, this
entity does not observe all BitTorrent traffic that traverses the Internet. Therefore, the IP
addresses that it finds sharing content are likely to be among the most active BitTorrent
users. This introduces a limitation in our study: we can know for sure that a household
is participating in piracy if it shows up in the BitTorrent logs but a household that does
not show up in these logs may still be illegally sharing copyrighted content. As such, we
acknowledge that our results generalize only to the sub-population of the most active pirates
(more precisely, those at TELCO that used BitTorrent during April and May 2014).
4.3 Experimental Setup
We worked with TELCO to run an experiment to give free access to the Cinema Pack to a
set of households for a period of 45 consecutive days. Treated households received an email
and a text message announcing the activation of the Cinema Pack as a Christmas gift, and
were told that access would last until the end of January. Activation did not require any
intervention from the households. After the experimental period, treated households received
a follow up email and a text message notifying them of the end of the free sampling period
and inviting them to subscribe the Cinema Pack for the usual fee. The activation of the
Cinema Pack occurred between December 15 and 18, 2014. Households with access to the
Cinema Pack could use time-shift TV to consume the content broadcast in these channels
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through the interface depicted in Figure 1, which resembles that of a SVoD service such as,
for example, Netflix or Hulu.
TELCO used stratified sampling to learn whether offering the new TV content would
lead households to use less Internet and reduce piracy. With stratified sampling, the units of
observation are split into stratum and randomly assigned to treatment and control in each
stratum separately (Simon, 1979). This design allows TELCO to increase statistical power,
in particular to the sub-population of pirates (Assmann et al., 2000), which we are interested
in this paper. Appendix A provides the full details of the experiment run by TELCO and
the sampling strategy used. Households observed in the BitTorrent logs from April and May
2014 are analyzed in this paper. They download an average of 3.5 GB/day from the Internet
(with a standard deviation of 5.2) and watch on average 4.4 hours of TV per day (with a
standard deviation of 2.5). In the absence of priors for the potential effect of treatment,
TELCO assumed that, on average, treated households would watch their preferred TV show
on TV rather than download it illegally from the Internet. Identifying a smaller effect is
arguably uninteresting from an economic point of view. According to Netflix, the average
TV show is 450 MB. According to Youtube, this corresponds to 15 minutes of video at
1080p. Therefore, TELCO planed this experiment to identify changes of 15 minutes in TV
consumption (which is a worst case scenario because the average Netflix show is likely longer
than 15 minutes) and changes of 450 MB in download traffic, with a confidence level of 95%
and with a power of 80%. This entails a random sample of at least 4034 households that use
BitTorrent, half of which should be gifted the Cinema Pack.
TELCO’s initial goal was to use a random sample of 18,000 households that did not
subscribe to the Cinema Pack in April and May 2014 (before the experiment). However,
the sample suffered from attrition, namely some households (i) had legacy set-top-boxes
(which do not allow for tracking TV and Internet usage accurately); (ii) had opted-out of
promotional campaigns before the experiment started; (iii) did not register a single day of
TV and Internet usage throughout the whole experiment; (iv) churned from TELCO during
the experiment. We note that sample attrition is orthogonal to treatment assignment and,
therefore, the results obtained from this experiment still have a causal interpretation. The
caveat is that they generalize only to the population of households that have up to date set-
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top-boxes, use TV and Internet regularly, do not churn and do not opt out from marketing
campaigns — which is still an interesting sub-population of users to study piracy. From the
original sample of 18,000 households, TELCO was left with 10,225 households half of which
were gifted the Cinema Pack.
4.4 Sample Balance
Table 1 describes key observed household level characteristics and Table 2 shows that the
experimental design described in the previous section achieved good balance with respect
to these covariates across treatment and control households. Balance for each covariate is
assessed using a t-test for the difference in means between treated and control households.
In all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that treated and control households are
statistically similar with respect to observable covariates at the 95% confidence level. Covari-
ates included and described in tables 1 and 2 are the ones that more strongly discriminate
households that use BitTorrent according to a machine learning algorithm that we describe
in Appendix A.
4.5 Usage of the Cinema Pack
Figure 2 shows the daily usage of the Cinema Pack per households in our sample before
(2014-12-01 to 2014-12-13), during (2014-12-19 to 2015-02-02) and immediately after (2015-
02-08 to 2015-02-15) the experiment. The dashed vertical lines show the activation and
de-activation periods of the offer. This figure shows that, on average, treated households
started using the Cinema Pack immediately after they received it and that they stopped
using it once the offer was over. In other words, learning effects are unlikely a significant
factor in our setting. Moreover, a number of control households subscribed to the Cinema
Pack on their own during the experiment. In fact, 19% of them used the Cinema Pack
for more than 90 consecutive minutes at least once during the experiment. Similarly, a
number of treated households did not use the Cinema Pack despite having access to it for
free. In our sample, only 65% of the treated households used the Cinema Pack for more
than 90 consecutive minutes at least once during the experiment. We choose 90 minutes
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Table 1: Description of covariates used in Table 2 of the paper. All these covariates are
averages computed during the pre-experimental period (2014-12-01 to 2014-12-13).
Variable Name Variable Description
Pirate Score Score from ML algorithm used to predict BitTorrent
use. Additional detail is provided in appendix A
Flag Torrent Indicator for whether household used BitTorrent dur-
ing the period
TV tenure Months since household acquired TV service
Internet tenure Months since household acquired Internet service
Telephone tenure Months since household acquired telephone service
Active Contract Indicator for whether household must pay a financial
penalty to churn
Download Daily download traffic from the Internet in Megabytes
Upload Daily upload traffic to the Internet in Megabytes
TV zapping Number of distinct TV channels zapped per day
TV Hours per day spent watching TV
CPTV Hours per day spent watching channels in the Cinema
Pack
of usage to define compliance because this is the average duration of a program broadcast
in the TV channels offered as part of the cinema pack (results are qualitatively similar for
other thresholds and are available upon request). These statistics show that we have non-
compliance on both sides of the experiment and therefore comparing treated and control
households yields the effect of the Intention To Treat (ITT) (Frangakis and Rubin, 1999;
Hollis and Campbell, 1999), which provides a lower bound for the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE). In addition, we compute the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) using treatment
assignment as an instrument for treatment compliance. The latter is the average effect across
the sub-population of households “whose behavior can be modified by random assignment
(compliers)” (Angrist et al., 1997). We include our LATE estimates in Appendix C, which
are in line with the findings reported throughout section 5.
15
Table 2: Balance in observed household covariates across control and treatment conditions.
Treated Control T-test
Avg. StDev Avg. StDev Std. Effect T-stat p-value
Pirate Score 0.566 0.251 0.569 0.249 -0.010 -0.492 0.623
Flag Torrent 0.580 0.494 0.579 0.494 0.003 0.137 0.891
TV tenure 95.273 56.999 93.193 55.886 0.037 1.859 0.063
Internet tenure 69.437 33.981 68.734 34.094 0.021 1.042 0.297
Telephone tenure 56.923 17.900 56.787 17.959 0.008 0.381 0.703
Active Contract 0.799 0.401 0.799 0.401 -0.001 -0.039 0.969
Download (MB/day) 3, 498.210 4, 652.621 3, 548.545 5, 181.386 -0.010 -0.516 0.606
Upload (MB/day) 2, 098.286 4, 794.800 2, 152.785 4, 987.432 -0.011 -0.562 0.574
TV Zapping 11.791 8.438 11.760 8.019 0.004 0.191 0.849
TV 4.368 2.499 4.416 2.520 -0.019 -0.964 0.335


















































































































Figure 2: Daily usage of the Cinema Pack across pirate households in our sample.
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4.6 Estimating the Fit of the Cinema Pack
We use the BitTorrent logs between June and November 2014 to build a recommender
system that allows us to generate personalized recommendations of movies to TELCO’s
pirate households. We note that this recommender system works very well for movies but
not for TV series because we do not have episode level information in our torrent logs. The
consequence is that we know if a households likes a particular series but we are unable to
issue recommendations for specific seasons or episodes of that series.
We use a Item Based Collaborative Filtering (IBCF) algorithm to build this recommender
system. IBCF is among the top technologies to design recommender systems and is used
by leading firms such as Amazon’s marketplace (Linden et al., 2003). Appendix B describes
the parameters used in our system as well as its out of sample performance. In short, the
performance of our algorithm is in line with that obtained elsewhere for datasets of similar
complexity. In particular, our algorithm performs as well as those reported in (Cremonesi
et al., 2010) for the cases of the Netflix and Movielens datasets, which have been repeatedly
used to benchmark the performance of recommendation technologies in several academic and
industry competitions.
Figure 3 shows how the fit between the content offered as part of the Cinema Pack and
that recommended to pirate households in our sample using the IBCF recommender system
described above changes with the number of titles recommended. The average fit with 150
recommendations is 10%. This means that the Cinema Pack includes, on average across
households in our sample, 15 out of the top 150 titles that this system recommends. We
note that this statistic varies significantly. Its range spans from 0% to 54% with 150 recom-
mendations and its variation is even larger with fewer recommendations. In subsection 6.1,
we show that this seemingly low average level of fit is expected for a catalog as large as the
Cinema Pack. Figure 3 also shows that the distribution of fit between the content offered
as part of the Cinema Pack and that recommended to pirates by our algorithm is similar
for treated and control households. This provides evidence that treated and control house-
holds have similar preferences for content, reinforcing the quality of the balance achieved by
TELCO’s randomized schedule. We note that this level of fit does not introduce any (small
17
sample) bias in our setup. If anything, and from an empirical point of view, it may only
limit our ability to find the effect that fit may have on piracy.




























































































































































































































































5.1 Household Level Effect of the Cinema Pack
Table 3 describes the covariates used throughout our results sections. Figure 4 provides
model free evidence of the effect of the Cinema Pack on TV usage, download traffic, upload
traffic and the likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment. The top row summarizes
the average daily household behavior before and during the experiment, and the bottom row
presents 90% confidence intervals for the difference in means between treated and control
households across these covariates. As expected, treated and control households do not differ
in any of these covariates during the pre-experimental period. During the experiment, treated
households watched more TV and downloaded less traffic. However, this figure provides no
evidence that treated households changed the amount of upload traffic or their likelihood of
using BitTorrent when gifted with the Cinema Pack.
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Table 3: Description of covariates used in Tables 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 of the paper. Inde-
pendent covariates starting with BExp. are averages computed during the pre-experimental
period (2014-12-01 to 2014-12-13). All other covariates are averages computed during the
experiment unless otherwise indicated.
Variable Name Variable Description
Treated Whether access to the Cinema Pack was offered
TV Time spent watching TV in hours per day
CPTV Hours per day spent watching the Cinema Pack
Download Download traffic from the Internet in Megabytes per day
Upload Upload traffic to the Internet in Megabytes per day
Flag Torrent All Whether BitTorrent was used to download movies or TV shows
Flag Torrent Movie Whether BitTorrent was used to download movies
Flag Torrent TV Shows Whether BitTorrent was used to download TV shows
BExp. TV Time Hours per day spent watching TV
BExp. Download Download traffic in Megabytes per day
BExp. Upload Upload traffic in Megabytes per day
BExp. Torrents Number of torrent downloads per day
Flag No Recs Whether it was possible to generate recommendations
Offer Fit Share of titles suggested by our recommender system that were
offered as part of the Cinema Pack during the experiment
Used Whether the Cinema Pack was watched at least once for more
than 90 consecutive minutes during the experiment
Wait Time Time elapsed in days since the beginning of experiment until the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 shows OLS results for the effect of offering the Cinema Pack on the logarithm
of the dependent variables (logarithm is used to adjust variable skewness), as well as time
dummies and pre-experimental controls to increase the precision of our estimators. Column
(1) shows that, on average, treated households increased TV consumption by 4.6% (p −
value < 0.01). Column (2) shows that this increase is associated with additional usage of
the Cinema Pack. Columns (3) and (4) show that treated households decreased download
and upload traffic by 4.2% and 4.5%, respectively (p − value < 0.05). These statistics
provide evidence of a small substitution effect away from Internet consumption toward TV
consumption induced by the introduction of the Cinema Pack.
Columns (5)-(7) provide no evidence that, on average, the introduction of the Cinema
Pack changed the likelihood of using BitTorrrent for pirate households during the experiment.
This is true overall as well as for movies and TV shows separately. Results in columns (5)-
(7) are obtained by transforming our daily panel into a cross-section. We do so to minimize
measurement error in our dependent variable — an indicator of whether the household uses
BitTorrent during the experiment. Our concern is not related to bias, given the randomized
treatment assignment, but arises because our torrent logs are obtained from a random sample
of all torrent traffic in the internet. Therefore the uncertainty associated with knowing
whether a household used BitTorrent during the experiment may increase the standard errors
in our regression(Wooldridge, 2010). Converting the daily panel into a cross section reduces
the likelihood of incorrectly classifying a household as a non user of BitTorrent during the
experiment.
Taken together these results suggest that, on average, pirate households in our sample
kept pirating during the experiment. However, this result may arise due to the low fit
between the content offered as part of the Cinema Pack and their preferences, or because





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Heterogeneous Effects of the Cinema Pack
We add to our regressions an interaction term measuring the level of fit between the con-
tent offered as part of the Cinema Pack and that recommended to each pirate household as
identified by the recommender system described in section 4.6. Table 5 shows the results
obtained using the logarithm of TV usage, Cinema Pack usage, and download and upload
traffic, as dependent variables. For each case, we show results using 50, 100 and 150 rec-
ommendations to each household. Columns (1)-(3) show that offering the Cinema Pack to
households in our sample increased the total time spent watching TV, irrespective of the
fit, by about 5%. Columns (4)-(6) show that this increase is associated with a shift in TV
consumption towards the channels offered as part of the Cinema Pack, and that this shift is
larger for higher levels of fit. Columns (7)-(9) show a decrease in the amount of download
traffic of about 4%, but we do not find evidence that this statistic changes with fit. Columns
(10)-(12) show a decrease in upload traffic of roughly 45% for households with a 100% fit.
The F − stats to test treated + treated ∗ offerfit = 0 are shown in the table. We believe
that our failure to identify a heterogeneous effect on downloads arises from a lack of power to
measure the interaction between treated and offer fit. Torrent download traffic accounts only
for 20% of all download traffic in TELCO’s network, while torrent upload traffic accounts
for 68% of all upload traffic. Therefore, the effect of the Cinema Pack on Internet traffic
is likely to be stronger on uploads, and we would need more households in our sample to
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6 shows the effect of the fit between the content offered as part of the cinema pack
and that recommended to each pirate household on piracy. Columns (1)-(3) use the likelihood
of using BitTorrent during the experiment as dependent variable. Columns (4)-(6) use the
likelihood of using BitTorrent to share streams associated to movies during the experiment
as the dependent variable. We reject the null hypothesis treated + treated ∗ offerfit = 0
for the likelihood of using BitTorrent in Columns (1)-(3). The corresponding F − stats are
shown in the table.
In sum, we find that a household’s decision to adopt the free legal SVoD offer is mediated
by the fit between the offered content and household preferences for content. Nonetheless,
our results show that even where there is a 100% predicted fit between the offered content
and a household’s preferences, there is only an 18% reduction in the likelihood of a household
using BitTorrent during the experiment. This suggests that for the vast majority of pirate
households, the marginal costs of consuming pirated content is essentially zero, a result that
has significant implications for anti-piracy policy, as we discuss in more detail below.
5.3 Robustness Checks
5.3.1 Household-Level Uplift Analysis
We use machine learning techniques to develop an incremental response model (Rzepakowski
and Jaroszewicz, 2012a,b) as a robustness analyis for our results. These models have been
increasingly used by economists and econometricians (Crump et al., 2008; Imai et al., 2013;
Athey and Imbens, 2015; Athey, 2015; Wager and Athey, 2015) to predict heterogeneous
treatment effects using results from randomized experiments. In this context, researchers
are interested in computing uplift, defined as
P (Outcomei|Treatmenti = 1, Xi)− P (Outcomei|Treatmenti = 0, Xi) (1)
for each subject i in the sample. In our case, the “Outcome” of interest is whether a
household uses BitTorrent during the experiment and “Treatment” indicates whether she
was given access to the Cinema Pack. We estimate expression 1 using a random forest
incremental response model as described in (Guelman et al., 2015), which we parameterize
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Table 6: Effect of treatment assignment on the likelihood of showing up in BitTorrent logs
Dependent variable:
Flag Torrent Flag Movie Torrent
LPM
50 Recs. 100 Recs. 150 Recs. 50 Recs. 100 Recs. 150 Recs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Treated * Offer Fit −0.184∗∗ −0.175∗ −0.182∗∗ −0.154∗ −0.198∗∗ −0.240∗∗
(0.082) (0.090) (0.092) (0.083) (0.099) (0.104)
Offer Fit −0.232∗∗∗ −0.027 0.152∗∗ −0.043 0.394∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.064) (0.065) (0.062) (0.075) (0.079)
Flg. No Recs −0.213∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log(BExp. TV Time) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(BExp. Download) 0.002 0.004 0.005 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(BExp. Upload) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BExp. Torrents 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.329∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
F-Test:
Treated×OfferFit+Treated=0 5.193** 3.992** 4.192** 3.653* 4.181** 5.420**
Observations 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225
R2 0.182 0.177 0.176 0.192 0.194 0.202
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.176 0.176 0.192 0.194 0.202
Residual Std. Error 0.392 0.393 0.394 0.447 0.446 0.444
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Analysis pertains to the period during the experiment;
Robust standard errors in ();
using 5-fold cross validation repeated 20 times. Figure 5 shows the obtained Qini curve. The
horizontal axis shows the proportion of households targeted, while the vertical axis shows
the resulting cumulative decrease in piracy behavior (in percentage points). The solid black
line depicts the effect of targeting households at random. The dashed U-shaped curve shows
the effect of targeting households on the basis of uplift starting from the households with
the most negative uplift to the households with most positive uplift.
In our specific case, this Qini curve helps us understand that while, on average, the treat-
ment had no effect, there were heterogeneous responses to the treatment across households.
For example, Figure 5 shows that treatment would be most effective if one targeted about
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50% of the households; that is, if one ordered households according to uplift and treated the
50% of them with the most negative uplift, then the probability of using BitTorrent would
reduce by 20% across our sample of households. As one adds households to the treatment
group from the one with most negative uplift to the one with the most positive uplift the
effect of treatment represented by the U-shaped curve deviates from that obtained if one
were to add households to the treatment group at random represented by the solid black
line. For example, if one were to treat 25% of the households at random, the average effect of
treatment would be roughly zero. If instead one were to treat the 25% households with the
most negative response to treatment then the average effect of treatment would be roughly
a decrease of 15% in the likelihood of BitTorrent use.
Clearly, the solid black line and the dashed U-shaped curve converge to each other when
no households are treated (0% in the horizontal axis) and when all households are treated
(100% on the horizontal axis). Hence, Qini curves are U-shaped relative to the line that
represents treatment at random when treatment effects are heterogeneous, in which is our
case. Table 7 shows the characteristics of households across quintiles of predicted uplift.
We observe that the introduction of the Cinema Pack was more effective at reducing the
likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment for households with moderate Inter-
net use (both downloads and uploads), moderate use of BitTorrent (before the experiment
started), relatively more use of BitTorrent to exchange movies vis-a-vis TV shows and, most
importantly, with higher fit with the content offered as part of the Cinema Pack. Therefore,
this analysis provides additional evidence of the mediating role that fit plays in deterring
piracy.
5.3.2 Content-Level Analysis
We aggregate the data from the randomized experiment at the content-level. Each obser-
vation now pertains to a title offered as part of the Cinema Pack. The covariate “Flag
Torrent” indicates whether the title was observed in the BitTorrent logs. The covariate
“During” indicates whether the observation pertains to the period prior to the experiment
or to the experimental period. The covariate “Treated” indicates whether “Flag Torrent” is
computed across treated or control households. More precisely, we select treated households
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Table 7: Treatment effect across quintiles of predicted uplift (household level).
Dependent variable:
Flag Torrent
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated * During −0.303∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.018 0.029 0.324∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
Treated −0.223∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.003 0.099∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020)
During 0.314∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant 0.608∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090 4,090
R2 0.200 0.044 0.015 0.044 0.224
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.044 0.014 0.043 0.224
Residual Std. Error 0.439 0.386 0.387 0.451 0.439
F Statistic 340.900∗∗∗ 63.380∗∗∗ 20.810∗∗∗ 62.930∗∗∗ 393.500∗∗∗
Household characteristics per uplift quintile before the experiment
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Avg. Uplift -0.085 -0.035 -0.012 0.019 0.083
Avg. Torrents / day 1.219 3.854 3.757 0.808 0.219
Frac. Torrents unknown 0.460 0.491 0.490 0.490 0.474
Frac. Torrents movies 0.214 0.178 0.166 0.141 0.117
Frac. Torrents tv shows 0.111 0.139 0.146 0.174 0.184
Avg. Download MB/day 3, 916.000 5, 406.000 4, 228.000 2, 695.000 1, 690.000
Avg. Upload MB/day 2, 324.000 6, 220.000 2, 838.000 969.800 355.100
Avg. TV Time h/day 4.351 4.477 4.560 4.504 4.534
Avg. Offer Fit ( 50 recs) 0.114 0.067 0.057 0.048 0.024
Avg. Offer Fit (100 recs) 0.113 0.082 0.068 0.053 0.027
Avg. Offer Fit (150 recs) 0.104 0.085 0.073 0.053 0.026
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in
(); Standard errors cluster by household; Q1-5 are the
quintiles of the “Uplift” distribution.
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and all movies and TV shows available in the cinema pack during the experiment to create
a list of available titles. Then, for each title and each period (before and during the exper-
iment) we set “Flag Torrent” to 1 if at least one of the treated households used BitTorrent
to download or upload this title during that period. We then repeat this procedure for
control households setting “Flag Treated” to zero in this case. This procedure provides us
with “Flag Torrent” computed over two distinct markets of households — the market with
access to the Cinema Pack and the market without access to the Cinema Pack. The only
difference between these two markets of households is that one comprises only households
treated with the Cinema Pack and the other comprises only households without the Cinema
Pack. Which households obtained the cinema pack was randomly determined in our setup.
Therefore, differences in behavior across these two markets can only be attributed to the
effect of treatment. Following Danaher and Smith (2014), we employ a differences in differ-
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ences approach and cluster the errors at the title level. Table 8 shows the results obtained.
We find that treated households pirated the titles included in the Cinema Pack less than
did control households. As expected, this result is in line with our findings in table 6 for
households whose preferences fit well with the content offered as part of the cinema pack.
Table 8: Effect of treatment at the content-level during the experiment.
Dependent variable:
Flag Torrent
Linear Probability Model (LPM)
All Movie TV Show All Movie TV Show
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * During −0.036∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.048∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.048∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.027)
Treated 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.019 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
During −0.001 −0.001 0.010 −0.001 −0.001 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.353∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.060) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Movie Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,392 5,976 416 6,392 5,976 416
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.657 0.641 0.910
Adjusted R2 0.0005 0.0005 −0.006 0.610 0.592 0.897
Residual Std. Error 0.480 0.482 0.436 0.300 0.308 0.139
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in (); Standard
errors clustered by IMDb id; Analysis includes the periods before and
during the experiment
5.3.3 Content-Level Uplift Analysis
We apply the framework used in section 5.3.1 to find heterogeneous effects at the content
level. In this case, a subject in our analysis is a movie or a TV show. We use “Flag
Torrent” as our “Outcome” of interest. In this case, “Treated” indicates whether this flag is
computed over treated or control households. Therefore, the computation of “Flag Torrent”
in this sub-section is similar to that employed in the previous sub-section. Figure 6 shows
the Qini curve obtained. The horizontal axis orders movies in the Cinema Pack from the
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most negative to the most positive in terms of estimated uplift. The “Uplift” curve shows
the cumulative incremental gains that would be obtained if TELCO changed the proportion
of movies included in the Cinema Pack from the bottom to the top decile of the “Uplift”
distribution. The “Random” curve plots the same information if the movies included in the
Cinema Pack were selected at random. The fact that the Qini curve deviates from the random
line provides evidence of heterogeneous effects across the population of titles included in the
Cinema Pack. Table 6 shows the characteristics of the content across quintiles of predicted
uplift. We observe that the introduction of the Cinema Pack was more effective at reducing
the likelihood of using BitTorrent for more popular movies (IMDb votes), for higher quality
movies (IMDb rating), for younger movies and relatively more for comedy and animation
movies and less so for drama, action, thriller and horror movies. In the next section, we
explore in more detail how movie age affects the ability of content distributors to build
SVoD catalog tailored to the preferences of pirates.
5.4 The Effect of Household Impatience
The analyses in the previous sections show that the fit between the preferences of pirates and
the content offered as part of the cinema pack mediates the effect of treatment assignment
on piracy, measured by the amount of Internet traffic uploaded and the likelihood of using
BitTorrent during the experiment. Another aspect of the misfit between what pirates would
have liked to watch and the content offered to them as part of the Cinema Pack is the fact
that households in our sample may be unaware of when a specific movie will be broadcast
in the Cinema Pack. The previous results show that a pirate willing to watch a specific title
is more likely to watch it using the Cinema Pack if this title is available there. However, if
this title is not available in the Cinema Pack when the pirate browses for content, then she
may pirate this title from the Internet or wait for it to show up in the Cinema Pack. This
rationale leads us to hypothesize that the introduction of the Cinema Pack might reduce
piracy more for the titles that are more readily available from the Cinema Pack and less so
for the titles that households need to wait longer to consume from the Cinema Pack.
Table 10 shows the household level results obtained when we interact treatment with the
time that households had to wait for the content that matched their preferences to show up
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Table 9: Treatment effect across quintiles of predicted uplift (content-level).
Dependent variable:
Flag Torrent
Linear Probability Model (LPM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated * During −0.205∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.059∗∗ −0.010 0.143∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.037)
Treated −0.026 −0.007 0.042∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030)
During 0.101∗∗∗ 0.003 0.010 −0.020 −0.098∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029)
Constant 0.625∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,224 1,228
R2 0.029 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.026 −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.035
Residual Std. Error 0.481 0.459 0.447 0.413 0.477
F Statistic 11.970∗∗∗ 0.747 0.723 1.538 16.040∗∗∗
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Avg. Uplift -0.053 -0.022 -0.007 0.010 0.052
Avg. IMDb Votes 151, 309.000 56, 188.000 50, 790.000 36, 593.000 41, 594.000
Avg. IMDb Rating 7.063 6.796 6.571 6.043 5.927
Avg. Movie Age 612.100 597.300 600.400 633.500 625.700
Avg. Days to first TV broadcast 4.759 4.310 6.678 7.569 7.586
Frac. Oscar Nominated 0.336 0.134 0.117 0.114 0.114
Frac. Drama 0.495 0.570 0.687 0.542 0.612
Frac. Comedy 0.440 0.391 0.287 0.242 0.205
Frac. Action 0.062 0.094 0.179 0.170 0.342
Frac. Thriller 0.052 0.088 0.111 0.216 0.336
Frac. Animation 0.101 0.088 0.036 0.049 0.026
Frac. Horror 0.020 0.042 0.023 0.101 0.114
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in (); Stan-
dard errors cluster by content IMDb identifier
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in the Cinema Pack. We compute the number of days that elapsed between the beginning
of the experiment and the day in which a certain movie showed up in the Cinema Pack. We
note that we perform this analysis for movies only using the recommender system described
in section 4.6. The movies offered as part of the cinema pack were all in their SVoD window
and thus were available in the market much before the experiment started. Therefore the
time elapsed between the start of the experiment and the day they were available in the
Cinema Pack is a good estimate for the time that households included in the experiment
had to wait to watch them. For each household in our sample, “Wait Time” in these
regressions is the average of that statistic across the top 150 recommendations suggested
by our recommender system. The first column shows the Intention to Treat (ITT) and the
second column shows the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In both cases, we observe
that treated households that had to wait longer had a smaller reduction in their likelihood
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of using BitTorrent during the experiment. Households that did not have to wait for content
that matched their preferences to show up in the Cinema Pack reduced their likelihood of
using BitTorrent during the experiment by 3.2%. Each day that households had to wait
for such content decreased this statistic by 0.1%. For the average wait time of 6 days in
our dataset, the effect of impatience increases the likelihood of using BitTorrent during the
experiment by 19% (0.00‘1/-0.032) relative to households that did not have to wait.











Used * Wait Time 0.002∗
(0.001)
Wait Time −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Flag No Recs −0.152∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Log(BExp. TV Time) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Log(BExp. Download) 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
Log(BExp. Upload) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)






Adjusted R2 0.176 0.175
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust Standard Errors in ()
Wait time is measured in days
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6 Estimating the Willingness to Pay for SVoD
6.1 Building a SVoD Catalog Tailored to Pirates
We discussed in the previous sections that the marginal cost of piracy is essentially zero for
the vast majority of the households in our sample. However, households whose preferences
align better with the content offered as part of the Cinema Pack reduce their likelihood of
using BitTorrent during the experiment. Consequently, the marginal cost of piracy for these
households cannot be zero because it must be higher than the marginal cost of consuming
SVoD, and the latter carries a positive misfit cost. Thus there must be a positive price that
these households would be willing to pay for SVoD service (a price that would just undercut
the positive marginal cost of piracy). In this section we estimate this willingness to pay.
The first challenge in this exercise is to build a SVoD catalog tailored to the preferences of
pirates. We use the recommender system described in appendix B to do so, but we need to
take two constraints into account. One is the size of the catalog that can be recommended.
The other is the titles that can be included in such a catalog due to restrictions in licensing
windows.
A catalog including all titles in the top 150 recommendations for all pirate households
in our sample would need to hold 12,616 different movies. For reference, and according to
uNoGS.com, Netflix’s catalog in the US carried 5,601 titles in May 2016 of which 79% are
movies. At the time, the smallest Netflix catalogs carried about 300 titles and are offered
in French Southern Territories. Some content has very broad appeal (Brynjolfsson et al.,
2006), which may allow content distributors to put together attractive catalogs without the
need to spend too much in licensing fees. Figure 7 shows that a small number of the 12,616
titles referred above cover a significant portion of the recommendations issued to pirate
households in our sample by our recommender system, but also that these titles are younger.
For reference, according to Ulin (2013), the SVoD window occurs about 12-15 months after
the theatrical release. In Figure 8 we vary the size of the catalog between 250 and 6,000
titles and the age of the titles that can be included in this catalog between 0 and 15 months
after theatrical release. In the left panel we order the 12,616 movies referred above according
to the number of households to which they are recommended and include the top ones as
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part of the catalog. In the right panel we do the same for the 9,158 titles that cover the top
15 recommendations to all households in our sample. We observe that the ability to match
household preferences expands logarithmically with the size of the catalog due to the effect
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Figure 7: Concentration of recommendations over popularity and age. Left Panel displays
Lorenz curve for the number of recommendations. Rigth Panel displays the Average age
of titles as more of them are included in the list of recommendations from the most to the
least recommended
In sum, building catalogs that cater to the preferences of pirates may be challenging
for content distributors. The left panel in Figure 8 shows that even a catalog as large as
Netflix’s in the US (5,600 titles) would only yield an average fit of 50% with the top 15
recommendations to households in our sample and a catalog as large as the Cinema Pack
(approximately 800 titles) is likely to only yield an average fit of 24%. These statistics are
for an exclusion window of 15 months.
6.2 Estimating the Pirates’ Willingness to Pay for SVoD
We use a standard discrete choice model (Train, 2009) to estimate how much treated house-
holds would be willing to pay for SVoD. In line with the model presented in section 3, we
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Figure 8: Distribution of the overlap between household recommendations and the content
of a SVoD catalog as a function of catalog size and licensing window. Left Panel considers
all recommended titles for all households in our sample; Rigth Panel considers only the
top 15 recommendations for each household in our sample.
piracy, TVoD+SVoD, TVoD+piracy, SVoD+piracy, TVoD+SVoD+piracy and no consump-
tion, which plays the role of the outside option. A dummy variable called “Piracy” is set to
one for the alternatives that include piracy. Each alternative is characterized by its price.
We set the price of TVoD at $5.1 USD, which is the average monthly TVoD expenditure
across households in our sample that used TVoD before the experiment started. We set the
price of SVoD to $13 USD, which is the price charged by TELCO for the Cinema Pack. We
set the price of piracy to zero. The prices of TVoD+SVoD and of TVoD+SVoD+piracy are
set to $5.1+$13=$18.1 USD, the price of TVoD+piracy is set to $5.1 USD and the price of
SVoD+piracy is set to $13 USD. Finally, we use treatment assignment as a characteristic of
each household. Treatment was randomly assigned to each household in our setting, which
allows us to immediately identify differences in willingness to pay between control and treated
households. We interact treatment assignment with the fit between the content offered as
part of the Cinema Pack and that recommended to pirate households by our recommender
system to measure how willingness to pay changes with fit.
Table 11 shows the results obtained using a multinomial logit choice model for channel
selection. The coefficients in this model represent marginal rates of substitution, that is,
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the dollar amounts that households would need to be paid to continue using piracy after
being offered SVoD for free or, in other words, their valuation for the piracy channel. In
line with previous results, column (1) shows that, on average, the treatment did not change
the households’ valuation of piracy. This lack of effect arises because the introduction of
the Cinema Pack did not change the likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment
for the average household. The introduction of the Cinema Pack induced only a change of
−0.044/−0.166 = $0.27 USD/month in the valuation of the piracy channel across households
in our sample but this effect is not statistically different from zero. However, columns (2)-(4)
show that households with a strong fit for the content offered as part of the Cinema Pack
reduced piracy, and that the value associated to this change is statistically different from zero.
For a household with 100% fit, this value is −0.798/−0.166 = $4.8 USD/month (p−value <
0.1), −1.072/ − 0.166 = $6.5 USD/month (p − value < 0.1) and −1.081/ − 0.166 = $6.5
USD/month (p− value < 0.1) when we use the recommender system with 50, 100 and 150
titles, respectively, to compute fit.
The estimates above measure the households’ average valuation of the piracy channel
and thus also their average willingness to pay for SVoD. For comparison, the Cinema Pack
is offered by TELCO at $13 USD/month and Netflix charges between $7.99 and $8.99
USD/month in the US. As the previous sub-section shows, on average pirates are likely
to obtain at most 50% fit with a SVoD catalog as large as Netflix’s in the US due to win-
dowing restrictions. For this level of fit, the last column in Table 11 yields a valuation of
−0.1081/− 0.166 ∗ 0.5 = $3.25 USD/month for the piracy channel. Therefore, we conclude
that attractive SVoD offers are only likely to convert pirates into lawful consumers of media
content if SVoD services are offered at prices significantly lower than those currently offered
in the market.
7 Conclusions
We partnered with a large telecommunications provider to obtain data from a real world
randomized experiment at the household level aimed at measuring the effect that offering
SVoD television content to pirate households will have on piracy consumption. During this
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Table 11: Results obtained using a multinomial logit choice model for channel selection.
Dependent variable:
Media Channel Choice
50 Recs 100 Recs 150 Recs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price −0.166∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Piracy 1.117∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041)
Piracy * Treated −0.044 0.007 0.020 0.014
(0.046) (0.053) (0.057) (0.058)
Piracy * Treated * Offerfit −0.798∗ −1.072∗ −1.081∗
(0.417) (0.567) (0.654)
Piracy * Offerfit 0.073 2.715∗∗∗ 4.817∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.418) (0.476)
TVOD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SVOD FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delta Piracy Value Treated 100% Fit -4.763 -6.330 -6.418
Predicted Market Share
OUTSIDE 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133
PIRACY 0.402 0.402 0.402 0.402
SVOD 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099
TVOD 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
PIRACY-SVOD 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293
TVOD-PIRACY 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
TVOD-SVOD 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
TVOD-PIRACY-SVOD 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Observations 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225
Log Likelihood −14,136.590−14,133.410−14,102.890−14,036.450
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
experiment, households that used BitTorrent in the past were given 45 days of free access to
10 new TV channels broadcasting movies and TV shows.
Using time-shift TV to watch these channels allows for consuming them as if they were
part of a SVoD service. On average, we find that treated households increased TV con-
sumption, decreased Internet use for both downloads and uploads, but did not reduce the
likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment. We also show that the effect of treat-
ment assignment on BitTorrent usage is mediated by the fit between what pirate households
would have liked to watch and the content offered to them as part of the Cinema Pack. We
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build a state of the art recommender system using item-based collaborative filtering tech-
nology, which we trained using BitTorrent logs for households in our sample prior to the
experiment. We use this recommender system to develop a measure of fit between what
households in our sample might have liked to have watched and the content offered as part
of the Cinema Pack. The average and maximum fit of the cinema pack is 12% and 100%
respectively when we use a recommender system that suggests 50 titles to each household.
We show that licensing windows impose significant restrictions on the content that can be
include in SVoD catalogs, which hampers the ability of content distributors to offer catalogs
catered to the preferences of pirates. For example, a catalog as large as Netflix’s in the
US (5,600 titles) would, at most, yield an average fit of 50% with the preferences of pirate
households. Therefore, the seemingly low average level of fit between the content offered as
part of the Cinema Pack and the preferences of pirate households in our sample is expected
given its small size (only 800 titles). Still, we are able to use the random assignment of this
SVoD service to pirate households to show heterogeneous effects. In particular, we show that
households with 100% fit with the Cinema Pack reduced their likelihood of using BitTorrent
by 18% and their amount of Internet upload traffic by 45% during the experiment. Finally,
using a multinomial logit model we estimate that pirate households whose preferences align
50% with the content offered by the Cinema Pack would be willing to pay $3.25 USD/month
for it.
The policy and managerial implications of our results are significant. We show that using
legal channels to curtail piracy will not require just “making content available.” Instead, it
will likely first require increasing the marginal costs of using pirate channels, for example
by increasing search costs to find content, the legal risks incurred when acquiring content,
or the technological inconvenience of consuming content. Absent significant changes in the
marginal costs of discovering, acquiring, or consuming pirated content, our results show
that to be successful in the fight against piracy, content creators will need to make content
available on digital channels much earlier than current industry practice and at much lower
prices than those charged today. This will require fundamental changes to the current
business model of the entertainment industry and will almost certainly lead to reduced
revenue streams. Our paper provides a first estimate of how much of a reduction may be
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expected to eradicate piracy using legal channels. However, reducing revenue streams may
also affect the production of content and the pace of innovation in the entertainment industry,
which may ultimately also reduce consumer surplus.
Finally, we note several limitations of our results. First, our study analyzes household
behavior in a specific country and attitudes towards piracy might be different across countries
based on local culture and regulation. Second, we can say for sure that a household in our
sample used BitTorrent when we observe it in the BitTorrent logs; however, other households
may also have used BitTorrent prior to the experiment. Third, we use differences in the use
of TVoD, SVoD and piracy induced by treatment to measure the pirates willingness to pay
for SVoD. However, a better approach to identify willingness to pay would have been to
offer SVoD at random prices to a sample of pirates and track their behavior. However, for
business reasons this was infeasible to implement at TELCO.
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A Sample Selection
The data used in this paper is a subset of a larger dataset that TELCO collected to study
households’ response to free trials of the cinema pack product. While our interest in this
paper is to understand the behavior of the population of BitTorrent users, TELCO was also
interested in learning if the average household would be more likely to subscribe to Cinema
Pack after a full featured trial of the service.
To ensure their goals, TELCO used a stratified sampling to learn whether offering the
new TV content would lead households to subscribe to the product afterwards, and to use
less Internet data and reduce piracy.
With stratified sampling, the units of observation are split into stratum and are randomly
assigned to the treatment and control in each stratum separately (Simon, 1979). This design
allows TELCO to increase statistical power, in particular to the sub-population of pirates
(Assmann et al., 2000) without compromising the generalizability of the analysis to the entire
population of client households.
TELCO used data from April and May 2014 (before the experiment started) to build a
classification algorithm to stratify a sample of households according to observable features
that correlate to BitTorrent use. The Caret framework was used to train and evaluate
the performance of different machine learning algorithms (Kuhn, 2008) on their ability to
predict if a household would show up in future BitTorrent logs. All algorithms were trained
and tested using 5 fold cross validation repeated 10 times. The outcome of this analysis is
depicted in Figure 9. This figure shows that most models fit the data well. In particular, the
Area Under the Curve (AUC) is near or above 80% in all cases. This threshold is usually
used as rule of thumb to assume that a model is good for predictive purposes(Swets et al.,
1988).
Variable selection is an integral part of gradient boosted model trees (GBM) (Friedman,
2001), random forests (RFOREST) (Breiman, 2001) and classification and regression trees
(RPART) (Breiman et al., 1984). For Support Vector Machines with radial Kernel (SVM)
(Hearst et al., 1998; Suykens and Vandewalle, 1999) and for the Logit model, feature se-
lection is a separate step. These models were trained using LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996) for
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feature selection. GBM was used to stratify the household sample because it yielded better
performance scores in all the metrics usually used to gauge the predictive performance of
these algorithms. Using the output of this model, the population classifier was constructed
such that households with GBM scores above 50% were marked as pirates, while households
with GBM scores below 50% were marked as non-pirates. Figure 10 plots the ROC curve
we obtained. The black dot identifies the classifier used to stratify households.
After classifying households TELCO looked for whether they showed up in the BitTorrent
logs. This allowed for creating four household strata. Households that were found in the
BitTorrent logs were called “Confirmed Pirates” – C. Otherwise they were marked as non-
pirates – NC. Households that the algorithm predicted as being pirates were called “Predicted
Pirates” – P. Otherwise, they were marked as non-pirates – NP. Therefore, the four strata
considered were (C,P), (C,NP), (NC,P) and (NC,NP). Figure 11 summarizes the features
that the GBM algorithm used to classify households as pirates and non pirates. This figure
shows that Internet upload traffic is the main determinant for this characterization, followed
by how long ago households subscribed Internet service and by whether they have legacy
or up-to-date equipment. We note that in this paper we end up analyzing only confirmed
pirates, that is, strata (C,NP) and (C,P). Also we only focus on households with up-to-
date equipment because households with legacy set-top-box devices cannot be tracked with





















































Figure 10: ROC chart for gradient boosted model trees algorithm.
Table 12 shows the average daily amount of traffic downloaded and TV usage per stratum
in April and May 2014. In the absence of priors for the potential effect of treatment, TELCO
assumed that, on average, treated households would watch their preferred TV show on TV
rather than download it illegally from the Internet. Identifying a smaller effect is arguably
uninteresting from an economic point of view. According to Netflix, the average TV show
consumes 450 MB of bandwidth. According to Youtube, this corresponds to 15 minutes of
video at 1080p. Therefore, TELCO planed this experiment to identify changes of 15 minutes
in TV consumption (which is a worst case scenario because the average Netflix show is likely
longer than 15 minutes) and changes of 450 MB in download traffic, with a confidence level
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Figure 11: Variable importance plot for the gradient boosted model tree algorithm.
each stratum to obtain this level of power.
Table 12: Minimum sample size required to identify changes of 450MB in downloads per
day and changes of 15 minutes of TV time per day with a 95% confidence level and 80%
power, final sample size and number of treated households per stratum. Stratum statistics







Avg. StDev. Min Sample per Avg. StDev. Min Sample per All Treated
treatment group treatment group
NC,NP 1.2 2.0 311 4.4 2.4 1,329 6,107 3,077
NC,P 3.8 3.0 698 4.4 2.6 1,698 5,134 2,508
C,NP 2.2 2.4 447 4.4 2.9 2,113 4,307 2,153
C,P 4.4 6.1 2,885 4.4 2.5 1,570 5,918 2,963
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To avoid running an underpowered experiment TELCO needed at least 3,057 treated
households per stratum. In fact, and to account for potential practical problems that
may arise during the experiment, TELCO randomly sampled 9,000 households in each stra-
tum. Subsequently, treatment assignment within each stratum followed a simple randomized
scheduled: half of TELCO’s households in each stratum were randomly assigned to receive
the free gift.
From the initial sample of 36,0000 households (9,000 per stratum), 7,590 households were
removed from the because they had a legacy set-top-box equipment which can not be used to
accurately track TV consumption. Another 3,270 households were removed from the sample
because they opted out of marketing campaigns. 2,125 households were removed because
they did not register a single day of TV or Internet usage during the experiment and another
1,549 households churned during the experiment.
A total of 21,466 households remained in the sample, distributed by strata as shown in
the last two columns of Table 12.
The number of households in each strata was still well above the minimum threshold
computed to identify the effect of interest.
In this paper we focus only on the population of confirmed pirates that include the 10,225
households in strata C,NP and C,P.
Table 13 shows that the experimental design described above achieved good balance in
key observed household characteristics across treatment and control households in all strata.
Balance for each covariate is assessed using a T-test for the difference in means between
treated and control households. In all cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
treated and control households are statistically similar at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 13: Balance in observed household covariates across strata
Treated Control T-test
Avg. StDev Avg. StDev Std. Effect T-stat p-value
NC,NP: Confirmed non-pirate, predicted non-pirate
Pirate Score 0.181 0.135 0.183 0.135 -0.013 -0.492 0.623
TV tenure 86.878 60.930 87.588 60.957 -0.012 -0.454 0.650
Internet Tenure 56.289 35.253 57.165 36.007 -0.025 -0.959 0.338
Telephone tenure 49.037 21.923 49.151 21.792 -0.005 -0.204 0.839
Active Contract 0.824 0.381 0.818 0.386 0.016 0.633 0.527
Download (MB per day) 1, 217.236 1, 913.677 1, 242.850 2, 124.813 -0.013 -0.494 0.621
Upload (MB per day) 269.733 1, 531.998 229.026 862.270 0.033 1.280 0.200
TV Channels zapped 11.676 7.940 11.518 8.036 0.020 0.773 0.439
CPTV 0.055 0.256 0.056 0.240 -0.003 -0.125 0.901
TV 4.393 2.403 4.474 2.476 -0.033 -1.289 0.198
VoD streams 0.927 1.074 0.943 1.113 -0.015 -0.591 0.555
NC,P: Confirmed non-pirate, predicted pirate
Pirate Score 0.763 0.065 0.764 0.064 -0.003 -0.121 0.904
TV tenure 99.347 55.084 99.905 55.204 -0.010 -0.362 0.717
Internet Tenure 75.900 34.593 75.829 33.590 0.002 0.074 0.941
Telephone tenure 60.441 17.468 60.789 17.241 -0.020 -0.717 0.474
Active Contract 0.808 0.394 0.809 0.393 -0.004 -0.151 0.880
Download (MB per day) 3, 770.558 4, 935.325 3, 738.642 5, 185.037 0.006 0.225 0.822
Upload (MB per day) 2, 331.399 5, 367.296 2, 229.316 4, 445.092 0.021 0.739 0.460
TV Channels zapped 11.809 8.427 12.094 8.339 -0.034 -1.213 0.225
CPTV 0.061 0.270 0.074 0.312 -0.046 -1.652 0.099
TV 4.402 2.601 4.390 2.429 0.005 0.181 0.857
VoD streams 0.983 1.112 0.950 1.085 0.030 1.064 0.288
C,NP: Confirmed pirate, predicted non-pirate
Pirate Score 0.304 0.151 0.311 0.150 -0.044 -1.456 0.145
TV tenure 93.136 57.657 91.215 55.605 0.034 1.111 0.267
Internet Tenure 66.586 34.231 66.391 34.349 0.006 0.186 0.852
Telephone tenure 54.911 18.944 55.335 18.639 -0.023 -0.740 0.459
Active Contract 0.802 0.398 0.793 0.405 0.024 0.775 0.439
Download (MB per day) 2, 193.011 3, 156.323 2, 212.563 3, 544.914 -0.006 -0.191 0.849
Upload (MB per day) 806.465 2, 448.565 722.401 2, 329.261 0.035 1.153 0.249
TV Channels zapped 11.640 8.179 11.948 7.965 -0.038 -1.249 0.212
CPTV 0.063 0.280 0.067 0.311 -0.014 -0.452 0.651
TV 4.375 2.505 4.464 2.512 -0.035 -1.150 0.250
VoD streams 1.020 1.180 1.010 1.108 0.009 0.286 0.775
C,P: Confirmed pirate, predicted pirate
Pirate Score 0.757 0.080 0.757 0.082 0.001 0.036 0.971
TV tenure 96.826 56.475 94.636 56.055 0.039 1.495 0.135
Internet Tenure 71.509 33.653 70.442 33.810 0.032 1.214 0.225
Telephone tenure 58.385 16.955 57.846 17.373 0.031 1.206 0.228
Active Contract 0.796 0.403 0.803 0.397 -0.019 -0.716 0.474
Download (MB per day) 4, 446.922 5, 292.187 4, 522.641 5, 917.408 -0.013 -0.518 0.605
Upload (MB per day) 3, 037.274 5, 766.615 3, 195.712 6, 039.995 -0.027 -1.030 0.303
TV Channels zapped 11.900 8.621 11.622 8.056 0.033 1.279 0.201
CPTV 0.070 0.284 0.069 0.284 0.005 0.211 0.833
TV 4.362 2.495 4.381 2.526 -0.007 -0.285 0.776
VoD streams 0.967 1.108 0.998 1.105 -0.028 -1.057 0.290
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B IBCF Recommendation Technology
We adapted the Recommender Lab R package (Hahsler, 2011) to implement our Item-Based
Collaborative Filtering (IBCF) algorithm (Sarwar et al., 2001). Item-to-item collaborative
filtering matches each of the target users downloads to similar content, called items. Then
it combines those similar items into a recommendation list. To determine the most-similar
match for a given item, the algorithm builds an item-similarity table by finding items that
customers tend to purchase together.
We note that we only use this algorithm to recommend movies and thus the proxy for fit
that it provides applies only to movies. Unfortunately, we are unable to apply this algorithm
to TV series because our torrent logs do not have episode level information. This means that
we are able to know users preferences across series, but are unable to recommend specific
seasons or episodes they should watch.
Figures 12 and 13 show the standard out-of-sample performance metrics used to evaluate
the top-N recommendations for each household. As benchmarks we compare the output of
our algorithm to that of: (1) a non-personalized algorithm based on item popularity which
recommends the titles that are most shared using BitTorrent by our sample of households;
(2) a personalized algorithm that provides recommendations at random.
The performance of our personalized IBCF algorithm is in line with the best results that
are achieved in datasets of comparable complexity. In particular, they are in-line with the
performance of the algorithms reported in Cremonesi et al. (2010) when applied to the Netflix
and Movielens datasets. The latter have been repeatedly used to benchmark the performance
of recommendation technologies in several academic and industry competitions. Similar to
Cremonesi et al. (2010) we find that the performance of the non-personalized algorithm
on the top-N recommendations is comparable to the performance of more sophisticated,
personalized algorithms. However, the non-personalized popularity-based algorithm does
not suit the goal of our exercise because it provides only (trivial) recommendations that
capture the preferences of the average household. This, however, does not inform us about
the preferences of each particular household in our sample, which is what we need in order
to construct a measure of fit between each household’s preferences and the contents offered
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as part of the Cinema Pack during the 45 days that it was available to treated households.































































Algorithm ● ibcf popular random
Figure 13: Left panel presents the Precision vs. Recall plot. The numbers on top of each
point denote the size of the recommendation catalog issued. The right panel presents the



















































Algorithm ● ibcf popular random
Finally, we determine the overlap between the set of titles recommended to households
using our IBCF algorithm and the set of titles available via the Cinema Pack. Figure 14
shows the distribution of this overlap for the case of the recommender system that suggests
popular items (those most shared content using BitTorrent by households in our sample
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before the experiment took place). The average overlap is 10% for the case of a list with
100 recommendations. This means that, on average across households in our sample, the
cinema pack includes 10 titles out of the 100 recommended by the recommender system.
This figure highlights the very low variation in the overlap across households. In fact, the
existing variation is solely explained by the fact that our recommender system removes titles
that households downloaded before.
Figure 15 shows the distribution of the overlap for the case of our personalized IBCF
recommender system. Similarly to the recommendation system based on content popularity,
the average overlap is 10% for the case of a list with 100 recommendations. However, with
the IBCF algorithm the range of the overlap is 0% to 78%, while with the non-personalized
recommendation system the overlap never exceeds 25%. In short, the IBFC algorithm is
able to recommend content to the tail of the distribution of preferences across households in
our sample, while a popularity-based recommendation system does not.
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Figure 14: Overlap between the top-N popular recommendations and the content offered as





































































































Figure 15: Overlap between the top-N IBCF recommendations and the content offered as


























































































































































































































































C Local Average Treatment Effect
We define that a treated household complies with the treatment (and a control household
does not) when the household uses the Cinema Pack for more than 90 minutes at least once
during our experiment. Most movies in the Cinema Pack are 90 to 120 minutes long. Results
using 20, 30, 60 and 120 minutes for the definition of compliance are qualitatively similar to
those reported below and are available upon request. Figure 16 shows that across all strata
in our sample, roughly 65% of the treated households used the cinema pack, compared to
around 18% of the control households. Therefore, in our setting, using treatment assignment
as an instrument for treatment compliance will yield the Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE) (Frangakis and Rubin, 1999; Hollis and Campbell, 1999). Table 14 shows the re-
sults obtained. In short, and in line with the main results in the paper, we find that the
introduction of the Cinema Pack did not change the behavior of the average household in
our sample, but that households whose preferences align well with the content offered as
part of the cinema pack reduced their likelihood of using BitTorrent during the experiment.
As expected, the magnitude of the effects reported in this table is larger than those reported
in the main paper because the effect of the Intention-To-Treat averages out compliers and
non-compliers. In this table, we report the effect for the sub-population of households in our
sample that indeed changed their behavior due to using the Cinema Pack. We observe that
among these households those whose preferences fit 100% with the content offered as part of








































































































Compliance Did not use Used
Figure 16: Compliance with treatment assignment in each stratum.
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Table 14: The Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) on BitTorrent usage.
Dependent variable:
Flg. Torrent Flg. Movie Torrent
2SLS 2SLS
50 Recs. 100 Recs. 150 Recs. 50 Recs. 100 Recs. 150 Recs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Used 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.008 0.016 0.022
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Used * Offer Fit −0.397∗∗ −0.352∗ −0.363∗ −0.334∗ −0.398∗∗ −0.476∗∗
(0.179) (0.183) (0.186) (0.182) (0.201) (0.210)
Offer Fit −0.154∗ 0.038 0.220∗∗ 0.023 0.467∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.090) (0.092) (0.091) (0.103) (0.108)
Flg. No Recs −0.213∗∗∗−0.195∗∗∗−0.179∗∗∗−0.295∗∗∗−0.257∗∗∗−0.224∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Log(BExp. TV Time) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(BExp. Download) 0.002 0.004 0.005 −0.029∗∗∗−0.026∗∗∗−0.023∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log(BExp. Upload) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BExp. Torrents 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.327∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225 10,225
R2 0.180 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.192 0.200
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.191 0.200
Residual Std. Error 0.393 0.394 0.394 0.447 0.447 0.444
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Analysis pertains to the period during the experiment
Robust standard errors in ()
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